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ARTICLE 
ALL SMART CONTRACTS ARE AMBIGUOUS 
 JAMES GRIMMELMANN† 
Smart contracts are written in programming languages rather than in 
natural languages. This might seem to insulate them from ambiguity, 
because the meaning of a program is determined by technical facts rather 
than by social ones. It does not. Smart contracts can be ambiguous, too, 
because technical facts depend on socially determined ones. To give 
meaning to a computer program, a community of programmers and users 
must agree on the semantics of the programming language in which it is 
written. This is a social process, and a review of some 
famous controversies involving blockchains and smart contracts shows 
that it regularly creates serious ambiguities. In the most famous case, The 
DAO hack, more than $150 million in virtual currency turned on the 
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contested semantics of a blockchain-based smart-contract programming 
language. 
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Those who lack intimacy with the machine cannot be 
expected a priori to have insight into its limitations. . . . 
Even in the most formal and most mechanical of 
domains, trust in the machine cannot entirely replace 
trust in the human collectivity.1 
INTRODUCTION 
“Smart contracts” are neither smart nor contracts,2  but the name has 
stuck. Instead, they are mechanisms that enforce agreements using 
software rather than law.3 The contracting parties write a computer 
program that embodies their agreement. The program updates as they 
perform their obligations, and automatically delivers the appropriate 
resources to them as they become entitled to payment. Smart contracts 
 
1 DONALD A. MACKENZIE, MECHANIZING PROOF: COMPUTING, RISK, AND TRUST 334 
(2001). 
2 Ed Felten, Smart Contracts: Neither Smart nor Contracts?, FREEDOM TO TINKER (Feb. 
20, 2017), https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2017/02/20/smart-contracts-neither-smart-not-
contracts. I will refer to “smart contracts” and “legal contracts” in this essay. 
3 Id. For more on the terminology and a discussion of how smart contracts relate to legal 
contracts, see infra Part I.  
2019]      ALL SMART CONTRACTS ARE AMBIGUOUS 3 
range from simple escrow schemes to immensely complicated joint 
ventures. 
One argument in favor of smart contracts emphasizes the clarity and 
certainty of code. Legal contracts are written in natural language, which 
is full of ambiguity, and must be interpreted subjectively by fallible 
humans. Smart contracts are written in programming languages, which 
are unambiguous and executed objectively by infallible computers. The 
result is that anyone reading a smart contract can predict what it will do 
in response to any conceivable set of events. Legal contracts are 
ambiguous; smart contracts are not. 
So goes the argument. But it is wrong. Smart contracts do not 
eliminate ambiguity — they hide it. The meaning of a legal contract is 
a social fact. So too is the meaning of a smart contract. It does not 
depend directly on what people think it means when they read it, as a 
legal contract’s meaning does. Instead, it depends indirectly on what 
people think about the computer systems on which it runs. Smart 
contracts may in fact be more predictable and consistent than legal 
contracts. Or they may not. But the argument that smart contracts are 
not ambiguous because they cannot be is false. Worse than that, it is 
dangerous, because it distracts attention from the hard work required to 
make smart contracts work in the real world. 
Part I of this essay reviews how smart contracts on blockchains 
work. Part II discusses ambiguity in natural and programming 
languages. Part III gives examples of ambiguous smart contracts. A brief 
conclusion then draws out some implications for blockchain 
governance. 
I. SMART CONTRACTS 
The defining feature of smart contracts is automation.4 They are 
executed by hardware and software — physical and digital systems 
embedded in the world — rather than by human instructions. Thus, they 
provide a way for parties to enjoy the benefits of binding contracts 
without relying on a legal system: private law without a public authority. 
The relationship between smart contracts and legal contracts is 
complicated.5 It is helpful to make two additional distinctions. One is 
 
4 See Nick Szabo, Smart Contracts: Building Blocks for Digital Markets, 16 EXTROPY 1, 1 
(1996); Nick Szabo, Formalizing and Securing Relationships on Public Networks, 2 FIRST 
MONDAY (1997). 
5 See generally J.G. Allen, Wrapped and Stacked: ‘Smart Contracts’ and the Interaction of 
Natural and Formal Language, 14 EUR. REV. CONT. L. 307 (2018) (explaining the intersections 
and differences between smart contracts and legal contracts); Lauren Henry Scholz, Algorithmic 
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between relations of obligation, like the legal obligation to pay $5 on 
Tuesday, and the instruments which evidence and establish those 
relations, like an IOU saying, “I will gladly pay you Tuesday for a 
hamburger today.”6 The other is between natural and formal languages. 
Natural languages are used by people to communicate with each other. 
They can evolve entirely without conscious direction, like English and 
Mandarin, or they can be created, like Klingon and Esperanto. Formal 
languages include programming languages, which consist of commands 
to a computer, as well as various mathematical and logical formalisms.7 
The paradigm of a legal contract is a relation of legal obligation 
based on a natural-language instrument. Because legal contracts can be 
oral or illusory, there can be legal obligations without a corresponding 
instrument, and vice-versa. In additional, legal contracts can incorporate 
terms in formal languages. For example, the price term in a contract 
could be expressed using an algebraic equation or based on the output 
of a program. The parties’ obligations would then be determined in part 
by the result of a computation. 
Obligations can also be technical rather than legal. A technical 
obligation is one that is enforced immediately by a system that prevents 
the prohibited conduct ex ante rather than punishing it ex post.8 All but 
the simplest technical obligations must be based on an instrument, and 
that instrument must be written in a programming language — this is 
just another way of saying that computers do only what they are 
programmed to do. The paradigm of a smart contract is thus a technical 
obligation based on a formal-language instrument. This is where the 
conflation of obligation and instrument in smart contracts comes from 
— and also where it breaks down. Because a legal obligation can be 
embodied in part in a formal-language instrument, a legal obligation 
may therefore “wrap” a technical obligation.9 On the other hand, parties 
who enter into a technical obligation at the same time may or may not 
enter into legal obligations effectively wrapping it — or they may even 
enter into legal obligations without knowing it or intending to.10 Much 
 
Contracts, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 128, 128, 136 (2017) (outlining various uses of smart contracts 
and arguing that ‘black box’ algorithmic contracts are likely unenforceable); Harry Surden, 
Computable Contracts, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 629, 688-89 (2012) (explaining that firms are 
driven to adopt smart contracts in part because of the advantages of applying computers’ high 
processing power to contractual obligations). 
6 Allen, supra note 5.  
7 Id. 
8  James Grimmelmann, Note, Regulation by Software, 114 YALE L.J. 1719, 1729–30 (2005). 
9 Allen, supra note 5.  
10 See Adam J. Kolber, Not-So-Smart Blockchain Contracts and Artificial Responsibility, 21 
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 198, 214-26 (2018) (distinguishing the “code” from the “contract”).  
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of the literature about whether “smart contracts” are “contracts” deals 
with this last question, but focusing too much on it obscures the other 
similarities and differences in the analogy.11 
A. Smart Contracts 
The turn to automation is motivated by three well-known difficulties 
with natural language and human institutions. The first is ambiguity — the 
fear that because legal contracts are written in natural language, they will 
be interpreted differently by different parties and judges.12 The second is 
corruption — the fear that human judges who interpret and enforce legal 
contracts can be threatened or bribed.13 A third is enforcement — the fear 
that parties might be able to ignore a legal judgment by fleeing the 
jurisdiction, delay, physical force, hiding assets, or never having assets in 
the first place.14 These are opportunities for smart contracts to improve on 
legal contracts; they are also challenges that smart contracts must confront. 
In this essay, I will focus on ambiguity, although, as we will see, the three 
are closely related. 
Smart contracts are designed to respond to all three of these concerns 
by expressing contractual terms in a programming language rather than in 
a natural language.15 Consider a standard example of a smart contract: a 
 
11 In this essay, I focus on the parallel with contracts, rather than with other kinds of legal 
instruments, such as wills, statutes, and terms of service, which raise distinct interpretive issues. 
I even avoid dealing with many interesting legal interpretive issues raised by smart contracts, 
such as whether they should be regarded as contracts of adhesion.  
12 Max Raskin, The Law and Legality of Smart Contracts, 1 GEO. L. TECH.  REV. 305, 324-
25 (2017).  See also Surden supra note 5; AARON WRIGHT & PRIMAVERA DE FILIPPI, 
BLOCKCHAIN AND THE LAW: THE RULE OF CODE (2018); Usha Rodrigues, Law and the 
Blockchain, 104 IOWA L. REV. 679, 682 (2019).  Or, to quote from Roger Traynor’s famous 
opinion in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. G.W .Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co.: 
If words had absolute and constant referents, it might be possible to discover 
contractual intention in the words themselves and in the manner in which they were 
arranged. Words … do not have absolute and constant referents. A word is a symbol 
of thought but has no arbitrary and fixed meaning like a symbol of algebra or 
chemistry. The meaning of particular words or groups of words varies with … 
context and surrounding circumstances … A word has no meaning apart from these 
factors; much less does it have an objective meaning, one true meaning. 
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. �omas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641, 644 (1968) 
(citations omitted). A term in a programming language, on the other hand, appears more like a 
“symbol of algebra” with an “absolute and constant referent.” Punch line: symbols of algebra 
don’t have absolute and constant referents, either. 
13 Raskin, supra note 12, at 319. 
14 See Szabo, Formalizing and Securing, supra note 4; Szabo, Building Blocks, supra note 
4. 
15 In theory, a smart contract could be implemented in hardware rather than in software. But 
any hardware sophisticated enough to implement a nontrivial smart contract would need to be 
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vending machine.16 Expressing the contract for the sale of a pack of 
Skittles in a programming language resolves all sources of ambiguity, 
because programming languages are unambiguous. The machine’s code to 
dispense an item from row C4 when the buyer has inserted $1.50 is 
completely specified. Committing the contract to the software resolves the 
fear of corruption, because computers are incorruptible. Threats and offers 
of bribes literally mean nothing to the vending machine. And the smart 
contract resolves the concern about enforcement because it takes direct 
control of the relevant resources. No money, no Skittles. 
The vending machine is obviously limited. Scaling it up to a true smart 
contract platform requires identifying and overcoming its major 
shortcomings: 
 
1. First, the vending machine is special-purpose: it is good only for 
spot candy sales. A better smart-contract platform would be 
general-purpose, capable of being used by many parties for many 
kinds of contracts. 
 
2. Second, the vending machine’s code is unobservable by the user. 
Unambiguous code can still be malicious. Every time you put a 
coin in one, you are trusting that its code really does instruct it to 
dispense Skittles when you push C4. A better smart-contract 
platform would make contract code visible to affected parties. 
 
3. Third, while the machine is by definition incorruptible, its 
programmer and its operator are not. You won’t get anywhere 
pointing a gun at a vending machine, but you might if you point a 
gun at the technician with a key to the coinbox when he comes to 
restock the Skittles. A better smart-contract platform would be 
decentralized. The power to supervise and control the execution 
of the smart-contract code would be dispersed over a large 
population, so that no individual or small group’s corruption 
threatens the contract.  
 
4. Fourth, the machine is physically vulnerable. If you punch a hole 
in the window, you can grab all the Skittles you want. A better 
smart-contract platform would have direct control over resources 
 
specified in some way, and that specification is effectively equivalent to a computer program. It 
is simply a program that is compiled into special-purpose hardware, rather than into object code 
for execution on general-purpose hardware. 
16 Szabo, Formalizing and Securing, supra note 4.  
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whenever possible. That is, whenever it could it would use virtual 
resources rather than physical ones.  
 
All of these design goals point in the same direction: put the smart 
contract on a blockchain. 
B. Blockchains 
At heart, a blockchain is a ledger of transactions. It organizes digital 
records of transactions into discrete chunks (blocks), and then maintains a 
chronological list of those blocks (the chain). A chain of blocks: a 
blockchain. Although the basic computer-science ideas are older,17 “Satoshi 
Nakamoto’s” Bitcoin proposal put them together in a clever way, greater 
than the sum of its parts.18 
The first important design choice is that the transactions in a blockchain 
are cryptographically secure. New transactions are processed only if they 
are digitally signed by the relevant party (usually the one who pays for them 
or transfers assets) using a private key that only they (should) know.19 New 
transactions are also required to be consistent with the history of transactions 
on the blockchain: you can’t transfer Bitcoin unless you received it in a 
previous transaction. Together, these consistency constraints mean that only 
parties who have digital assets are able to use them in transactions. 
The second important design choice is that the blockchain is a distributed 
ledger. Every participant has (or could have, if they wished) a complete copy 
of the entire blockchain. No participant’s copy is canonical; all are equally 
authoritative. Thus, there is no centralized recordkeeper with authority over 
the ledger. This is where blockchains achieve their resistance to corruption: 
anyone hoping to tamper with the ledger will need to suborn a significant 
fraction of participants, not just one.20 
 
17 See Arvind Narayanan & Jeremy Clark, Bitcoin’s Academic Pedigree, 60 COMM. OF THE 
ACM 36 (2017) (describing the basic structure of blockchain). See generally FINN BRUNTON, 
DIGITAL CASH: THE UNKNOWN HISTORY OF THE ANARCHISTS, UTOPIANS, AND 
TECHNOLOGISTS WHO BUILT CRYPTOCURRENCY (2019). 
18 Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System (2008), 
https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf. See generally ARVIND NARAYANAN ET AL., BITCOIN AND 
CRYPTOCURRENCY TECHNOLOGIES: A COMPREHENSIVE INTRODUCTION (2016). 
19 �is is possible because with modern public-key encryption, other participants can verify 
that a message was properly signed by the private key holder even though they do not themselves 
have the private key. 
20 �e redundancy also means that blockchains are practically impervious to hardware 
errors: any idiosyncratic faulty execution on one participant’s computer will be massively 
outvoted by the collectivity of participants whose computers did not malfunction. �us, in what 
follows, I will ignore the philosophical objection that no program can guarantee that it runs 
correctly on actual hardware. See, e.g., James H. Fetzer, Program Verification: The Very Idea, 37 
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The third important design choice solves a problem introduced by the 
second. Distributed systems need to reach some form of consensus: if 
multiple parties can each have copies of the ledger, there must be some way 
to keep their copies in sync, or to deal with the disagreement if they are not. 
Bitcoin’s mechanism to do so — the Bitcoin consensus protocol — is the 
most ingenious part of Nakamoto’s design for Bitcoin and is in some ways 
the most interesting and influential thing about it. 
In brief, the Bitcoin consensus protocol asks participants (called 
“miners”) to accept any valid new block of transactions that one miner 
proposes — but it makes the process of generating a valid new block 
onerous and unpredictable. (The difficulty is regularly adjusted so that the 
entire community of miners can on average generate only one new block 
every ten minutes.) When a miner broadcasts the block to other miners, they 
examine it, confirm that it satisfies the consistency constraints, and then with 
majority approval, add it to the current blockchain. Then the process begins 
anew to generate the next block. 
Incentives are needed to make miners generate and accept blocks. A 
miner receives a “block reward” of new Bitcoin for each block they 
successfully generate, and “transaction fees” paid by users to add their 
transactions to a block. Their incentives to accept valid blocks proposed by 
other miners come from the value of consensus itself: new blocks can only 
be added to what everyone else agrees is the current end of the chain. So a 
miner who fails to approve a valid block may be cutting herself off from 
future mining rewards: any blocks she generates will not be at the end of the 
chain. In equilibrium, the dominant individual strategy for individual miners 
is typically to accept any valid new block and immediately start trying to 
generate a block that follows it. 
C. Smart Contracts on Blockchains 
Now let us consider how to put smart contracts on a blockchain. The 
basic idea is simple. There is still a ledger of transactions, maintained in 
the same way as the Bitcoin blockchain. The difference is that these 
transactions are richer: they can create and execute computer programs, 
not just transfer resources. 
These programs run on a virtual machine. As the name implies, it 
executes instructions like an actual computer, but it is entirely simulated. 
The Ethereum blockchain, for example, implements the Ethereum Virtual 
 
COMMS. OF THE ACM 1048, 1059–60 (1988). When it comes to hardware faults, the objection is 
ontologically impeccable but practically irrelevant in this context. �e more relevant objection, 
as I argue below, is that no program can guarantee that people will run it as intended. 
2019]      ALL SMART CONTRACTS ARE AMBIGUOUS 9 
Machine (EVM). One kind of transaction on the Ethereum blockchain 
simply transfers its native currency unit — called “Ether” — from one user 
to another. Another kind of transaction takes a program written in the 
EVM’s native language (“EVM bytecode”) and runs it on the EVM. 
This last sentence is deceptively simple, so it is worth unpacking. The 
EVM is a simulated computer. It functions according to rules described in 
the Ethereum protocol21 — that is, each participant on the blockchain 
independently applies those rules to each new transaction and confirms 
that they yield the same result. The consensus protocol ensures that each 
user observes the same transfer and program transactions. Thus, just as the 
participants agree on each user’s current balance of Ether because they 
agree on how each transfer transaction changes those balances, they agree 
on the EVM’s current state because they agree on how each program 
transaction changes the EVM. The rules are significantly more 
complicated (though far less complicated than the circuits in a typical 
physical computer), but they are deterministic.  
There are a few more details worth noting. First, EVM bytecode 
includes instructions for programs to send and receive Ether. A program 
can transact with users (or with other programs) by executing these 
instructions. Second, programs can be persistent: one user can load a 
program into the EVM with an initial transaction, and other users can then 
interact with it in subsequent transactions (if and how its code allows, that 
is). Together, these features enable smart contracts: I can offer you a smart 
contract by loading its terms into the EVM, and you can accept by sending 
it an appropriate transaction. Third, these program transactions are not 
free. Ethereum has a complicated metering scheme in which programs 
consume a resource called “gas” as they run: users must pay (with Ether) 
for enough gas for the programs they run. The design is both clever and 
ambitious. 
II. AMBIGUITY  
It might be hoped that this approach to putting smart contracts on a 
blockchain solves the three problems with legal contracts identified 
above. The smart contracts are unambiguous because they are written in 
programming languages. The smart contracts are incorruptible because 
control of the blockchain is widely distributed. And enforcement is 
 
21 See generally GAVIN WOOD, ETHEREUM: A SECURE DECENTRALISED GENERALISED 
TRANSACTION LEDGER (2014); ANDREAS M. ANTONOPOULOS & GAVIN WOOD, MASTERING 
ETHEREUM: BUILDING SMART CONTRACTS AND DAPPS (1st ed. 2018).  
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automatic because the smart contract directly controls resources on the 
blockchain. I believe these hopes are overstated. 
A. Ambiguity in Natural Languages 
Consider a famous example of the ambiguity of natural language. In 
Frigaliment Importing Co. v. BNS International Sales Corp., the parties 
disagreed on the meaning of “chicken.”22 Their contract called for the 
delivery of 100,000 pounds of “"US Fresh Frozen Chicken, Grade A, 
Government Inspected, Eviscerated.” The buyer thought that “chicken” 
meant “a young chicken, suitable for broiling and frying.”23 The seller 
thought it meant “any bird of that genus.”24 The court considered 
dictionary definitions, the text of the contract, the parties’ negotiations 
(in a mixture of English and German), evidence of trade usage in the 
chicken-evisceration industry, USDA inspection standards, and 
prevailing market prices, only to conclude that there was evidence on 
both sides, so the plaintiff had failed to carry its burden of “showing that 
‘chicken’ was used in the narrower rather than in the broader sense.”25 
In short, “chicken” was ambiguous. 
The parties in Frigaliment could have prevented their particular 
dispute if they had written “young chicken suitable for broiling.”26 But 
that would just have raised further ambiguities in other cases. What 
counts as “suitable for broiling?” Suitable for broiling at 500 degrees 
Fahrenheit? 550? For how long? Ambiguity always remains. 
The problem is inherent in the nature of natural language, because 
natural language is inherently social. The meaning of a text is not the 
(single) meaning its author intended, but the (possibly different and 
possibly plural) meanings it has within the relevant linguistic 
community. Even the meanings given in “objective” sources like 
dictionaries — putting aside all of the interpretive problems of how to 
read those sources — depend on how people actually use words. And 
since the legal effect of a contract is determined by the interpretation of 
its terms, the meaning of a contract is irreducibly social. 
 




25 Id. at 121. 
26 Or “any bird of the genus gallus gallus domesticus” if they had settled on the seller’s 
preferred meaning rather than the buyer’s. 
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B. Ambiguity in Programming Languages 
To repeat, the meaning of “chicken” is a socially contingent fact. It 
depends on how people actually use the word in the world. Its meaning 
can vary and be misunderstood.   
It might be argued, however, that the meaning of an expression in a 
programming language is a technical fact rather than a socially 
contingent fact. 2**3 in Python will always evaluate to 8. Its meaning 
never changes, and if you think it means 9 you are wrong. Meanings 
that depend on socially contingent facts can be ambiguous, but 
meanings that depend on technical facts cannot. 
This account is wrong. It is true that competent programmers in a 
given language will agree on a program’s meaning (at least for simple 
programs). And their agreement does depend on technical facts about 
the language that are independent of particular programmers’ 
idiosyncratic beliefs. But these technical facts are still social, just at a 
deeper level. 
In a nutshell, no computer program can determine its own semantics. 
The program may have a fixed, objective syntax. But the act of giving 
meaning to that syntax — whether by talking about the program or by 
running it — requires something outside the program itself. Any 
strategy for doing so ultimately depends on social processes. 
Consider Python. The Python Reference Manual says that ** “yields 
its left argument raised to the power of its right argument.”27 This is an 
informal specification: it describes the semantics of Python programs 
using natural language. There are also formal (if unofficial) semantics 
for Python, which use mathematical notation to define the behavior of 
Python programs.28 Or one could run CPython, the most commonly used 
Python implementation,29 and confirm that it evaluates 2**3 to 8. 
But wait! Even seemingly innocuous phrases like “raised to the 
power of” can conceal difficulties. What is 0 raised to the power of 0? 
Is it 1 because x0 = 1 for all x≠0? Is it 0 because 0y=0 for all y≠0? Is it 
meaningless in the same way that applebanana is? This is the kind of 
question on which mathematicians can disagree.30 Replacing the 
 
27 GUIDO VAN ROSSUM, THE PYTHON LANGUAGE REFERENCE, RELEASE 3.2.3 49 (Fred L. 
Drake, Jr. ed., 2012). 
28 See, e.g., Joe Gibbs Politz et al., Python: The Full Monty, in PROC. OF THE 2013 ACM 
SIGPLAN INT L CONFERENCE ON OBJECT-ORIENTED PROGRAMMING SYSTEMS, LANGUAGES, 
AND APPLICATIONS 217 (ACM Press 2013).  
29 See ALTERNATIVE PYTHON IMPLEMENTATIONS, 
https://www.python.org/download/alternatives (last visited May 1, 2019) (calling CPython “the 
‘traditional’ implementation of Python.”).  
30 Donald E. Knuth, Two Notes on Notation, 99 AM. MATH. MONTHLY 403, 407–08 (1992). 
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English phrase “raised to the power of” with the mathematical notation 
“xy” — as one might in a formal semantics —  does not conclusively 
settle the question, because it is the underlying mathematical concept, 
not the notation, that is the subject of disagreement. Even CPython is of 
two minds on the matter. The integer expression 0**0 evaluates to 1, but 
the equivalent decimal floating-point expression produces an “Invalid 
operation” error.31 This isn’t just a Python issue, either. The most recent 
C standard says that pow(0.0, 0.0) is undefined, but many 
implementations return 1.0.32 Is the standard correct? Or is it wrong in 
the way that an out-of-date dictionary is — no longer reflective of actual 
usage?  
One might reasonably dismiss 00 as an unusual, even pathological, 
example. But it demonstrates in miniature the dependence of technical 
questions on social ones. Informal specifications, formal semantics, and 
reference implementations all define the meaning of a program created 
by humans in terms of something else also created by humans. So the 
meaning of any specific program rests on a foundation of some prior 
agreement about how to interpret some larger class of programs. 
Specifications, formal semantics, and reference implementations are not 
authoritative as a matter of first principles; they are authoritative 
because people agreed that they are. Why doesn’t 2**3 in Python 
evaluate to 9? Not because that’s what 2**3 inherently means — any 
more than the seven-letter sequence C-H-I-C-K-E-N inherently means 
any gallus gallus domesticus. In 1991, Guido van Rossum selected ** as 
an exponentiation operator for Python and defined its behavior. He 
could have used ^ instead and made ** a multiplication operator. If he 
had, then 2**3 would evaluate to 6. 
But, one might ask, isn’t it a logical necessity that 23=8? As long as 
the Python specification defines x**y as xy, don’t the laws of 
mathematics require that it evaluate to 8 in any correct implementation 
of Python? There is something to this point, which serves as the 
foundation of the field of program verification: rigorous standards of 
proof and truth can be applied to mathematical models of programs. 
Given a formal semantics of a programming language and a precise 
specification of a program’s operating requirements, it is sometimes 
possible to produce a logically valid proof that the actual program 
 
31 See Devin Jeanpierre, Issue 23201: Decimal(0)**0 is an error, 0**0 is 1, but Decimal(0) 
== 0, PYTHON BUG TRACKER (Jan. 9, 2015, 3:13 AM), https://bugs.python.org/issue23201. 
32 For example, the Apple LLVM 10.0.0 compiler displays this behavior (last tested February 
19, 2019 on a MacBook Pro running macOS 10.13.6). I am grateful to Russ Cox for this example.  
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correctly implements the specification.33 But there is a crucial step 
missing: no formal proof is possible that the specification itself 
corresponds to anything in the outside world.34 Change the language 
semantics and all you are left with is an incorrect program and an invalid 
“proof” of its correctness. 
Here is another way of appreciating the point. Consider the Python 
expression 3/2. What will happen if you evaluate it? It depends. If you 
run it in Python version 2.7.15, where / is an integer division operator, it 
will return 1. But if you run it in Python version 3.7.1, where / is an exact 
division operator (and // is the integer division operator), it will return 
1.5. “Python” is not one thing. What we mean when we say “Python” is 
socially determined.35 Under some circumstances, we mean Python 
2.7.15; under others we mean Python 3.7.1.36 (If we mean Python 2.7.15, 
then when we say “the value of the Python expression 3/2” we refer to 
1, but if we mean Python 3.7.1, when we say “the value of the Python 
expression 3/2” we refer to 1.5. The value of the expression is 
unambiguous relative to a specific programming language, but that is 
like saying that the meaning of “chicken” is unambiguous relative to an 
interpretive convention in which it means any gallus gallus domesticus. 
All the important work is done by the claim that this program is written 
in that language. Such claims can only be established by reference to a 
community of programmers and users. 
2**3 in Python is unambiguously 8, but that is only because Python 
users have already agreed on what “Python” is. If they agreed 
differently, “Python” would be different and so might 2**3. Collective 
negotiation over the agreed meaning of “Python” is constantly taking 
place: in particular, it happens every time there is a new version release. 
Among other changes, Python 3.7 added a new function called 
breakpoint, but it also made await a reserved keyword.37 Programs 
that call the breakpoint function work in Python 3.7 but not in Python 
3.6; programs with a variable named await work in Python 3.6 but not 
in Python 3.7. These changes are debated at immense length on Python 
developer mailing lists,38 and each time there is a new release, everyone 
 
33 See generally MACKENZIE, supra note 1 (describing history of controversies over program 
verification).  
34 Brian Cantwell Smith, Limits of Correctness in Computers, in PROGRAM VERIFICATION: 
FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES IN COMPUTER SCIENCE 275 (Timothy R. Colburn et al. eds., 1993). 
35 So, for that matter, is what we mean when we say “Python 2.7.15.” 
36 In linguistic terms, the phrase “Python” is underspecified and requires pragmatic 
enrichment. 
37 Python Software Foundation, What’s New In Python 3.7 (Elvis Pranskevichus ed.), 
https://docs.python.org/3.7/whatsnew/3.7.html. 
38 See, e.g., PYTHON-DEV, https://mail.python.org/mailman/listinfo/python-dev.  
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who is responsible for writing or running Python code decides whether 
or not to upgrade their version to the latest one. These choices 
collectively establish the meanings of Python programs — and change 
those meanings over time. Technical facts depend on socially 
determined ones. 
More precisely, we perceive as fixed technical facts the successful 
result of coming to social consensus on programming language 
semantics. A community of programmers and users agrees on a process 
to extract technical meaning from program text. Developers implement 
that process on different computers, with different tools, in different 
contexts. Most of the time, running a program on different 
implementations will yield the same result. When it does not, technical 
meaning breaks down. 
III. AMBIGUITY IN SMART CONTRACTS 
Back to blockchains. We might be able to ignore all of this if smart-
contract blockchains never experienced breakdown.39 But in fact, there are 
difficulties about the meanings of blockchain programs all the time. I will 
present four examples, in increasingly dire order. 
A. Oracles 
How does a smart contract observe the world? Suppose, for example, 
that it needs to release funds from escrow when the seller has delivered a 
car. The car is a real thing in the real world, not a virtual thing defined by 
the blockchain VM. The smart contract cannot directly observe it. 
The standard solution is to rely on an oracle to input real-world data in 
a form usable by a smart contract.40 The simplest version of an oracle is 
simply a trusted user, who is asked to commit transactions verifying that a 
given event did or not take place, and perhaps supplying some details. This 
is basically a smart-contract version of an arbitrator or third-party 
certification. The next step up in complexity is to use a trusted data feed. 
Trusted software on the blockchain consults some online but off-
blockchain data source — like a major financial website’s stock quotations 
— and enters it into the blockchain.41 The most sophisticated form of 
 
39 See TERRY WINOGRAD & FERNANDO FLORES, UNDERSTANDING COMPUTERS AND 
COGNITION: A NEW FOUNDATION FOR DESIGN (1987) (applying Heiddeger’s concept of 
breakdown to the skew between computer models of the world and the world itself). 
40 See ANTONOPOULOS & WOOD, supra note 21, at 253–66.  
41 For a sophisticated authenticated data feed solution, see Fan Zhang et al., Town Crier: An 
Authenticated Data Feed for Smart Contracts 270 (2016). 
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oracle is a consensus oracle: a group of users serve as oracles and the 
software extracts whatever value they have agreed on. Even simple 
majority voting can make it harder to corrupt enough involved users to 
trick a given smart contract, and some consensus oracles use their own 
consensus protocols, in which the users are rewarded for their participation 
and for reaching agreement. 
But is the oracle correct? We might describe this as a problem of 
corruption: an oracle that says the car was delivered when it was not is 
mistaken or lying in the way that a bad judge will be mistaken or lying 
about a legal contract. Consensus oracles, following the standard 
blockchain mantra of decentralization, seek to limit corruption by using 
protocols that encourage correct agreement among the parties. But of 
course the oracle software has no unmediated access to the truth in the 
world. Instead, the best its protocols can do is encourage parties to agree 
— in the hopes that truth will be a more salient focal point than a lie, and 
that long-term incentives will lead parties to select honest oracles. 
The problem of observing the world is also a problem of ambiguity. 
The world is complex, and contract terms map ambiguously onto the 
world. An oracle is a way of resolving the ambiguity in how a contract 
term applies to the infinite variety of factual patterns that could happen in 
the world. An oracle charged with determining whether the seller in 
Frigalament has performed its obligations resolves any ambiguity about 
the meaning of “chicken.” If the oracle says the seller has performed, then 
what was delivered was “chicken.” If the oracle says the seller has not 
performed as required, then whatever was delivered was not “chicken.”42 
An oracle’s consensus protocol, then, is crucial to how it operates. 
Single-user oracles and trusted data feeds have simple trust models and 
consensus protocols; consensus oracles have more sophisticated ones. This 
leads to two points. The obvious one is that an oracle’s resistance to 
corruption is only as good as its consensus mechanism. The subtler one is 
that an oracle’s ability to resolve ambiguity is only as good as its consensus 
mechanism. 
B. Upgrades 
Blockchains also upgrade. In 2017, Bitcoin upgraded to implement 
“segregated witness” (also known as “SegWit”).43 Some data in 
transactions was moved from one portion of the block to another in a way 
 
42 Allen, supra note 5.  
43 Timothy B. Lee, Bitcoin compromise collapses, leaving future growth in doubt, ARS 
TECHNICA (Nov. 9, 2017), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/11/bitcoin-compromise-
collapses-leaving-future-growth-in-doubt/. 
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that effectively increased the number of transactions that could fit in each 
block.44 The blockchain before SegWit and the blockchain after had 
different semantics. 
Actually, I’m hiding the ball by saying that “Bitcoin upgraded.” 
Blockchains don’t upgrade themselves; people upgrade blockchains. 
Bitcoin’s users collectively acted to modify Bitcoin’s semantics in ways 
that would invalidate some transactions. A critical mass of miners 
announced their support for SegWit, and then on the agreed-upon date 
started enforcing the new rules. Everyone else went along for the ride. It 
was just like switching from Python 3.6 to Python 3.7, except that with a 
blockchain the pressure for consensus is much stronger. Today you can 
easily find users still happily running Python 3.6, but you will not easily 
find Bitcoin miners ignoring SegWit. 
It’s consensus all the way down.45 The “Bitcoin blockchain” exists 
only because people agree that it does and what it is. Bitcoin’s consensus 
protocols help coordinate that agreement; indeed, they incentivize it. But 
the protocols themselves cannot establish their own rule of recognition. A 
user community can always collectively change or ignore them. This is 
exactly what happens in an upgrade. 
C. Forks 
Upgrades don’t always go smoothly. SegWit was intended (by some 
users at least) as the first of two linked upgrades to increase Bitcoin’s 
capacity. Following the SegWit upgrade, according to a widely reported-
on compromise among various Bitcoin developers, Bitcoin was also 
supposed to increase its block size from 1 megabyte to 8 megabytes, 
octupling the number of transactions it could process per block.  
This . . . didn’t happen.46 Instead, following the SegWit upgrade, 
some miners announced they were against the block size upgrade, while 
others announced they were for it. Discussions and negotiations broke 
down, and Bitcoin forked into two blockchains.47 One of these 
blockchains, now known as Bitcoin Cash, increased its block size to 8 
megabytes (and then increased it again to 32 megabytes, having 
 
44 See Jonathan Cross, Bitcoin Improvement Proposal 141, GITHUB (March 10, 2018), 
https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0141.mediawiki.  
45 Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, The Persistence of “Dumb” Contracts, 2 STAN. J. BLOCKCHAIN L. & 
POL’Y 1, 10 (2018) (smart contracts “have value … simply because there is universal consensus 
they are what they are”).  
46 Lee, supra note 42. 
47 Benito Arruñada, Blockchain’s Struggle to Deliver Impersonal Exchange, 19 MINN. J.L. 
SCI. & TECH. 55, 73–75 (2018). 
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established the principle that the block size should grow as needed). The 
other blockchain, now known as Bitcoin, still has roughly 1 megabyte 
blocks.48 The blockchains recognize the same history up until the first 
>1 megabyte block on Bitcoin Cash, after which they diverge. 
Bitcoin and Bitcoin Cash now have different semantics. Is a block 
valid? The question is unanswerable in the abstract. It can only be 
answered with reference to a particular blockchain and its user 
community. A 32-megabyte block is valid according to the agreed-upon 
semantics of the Bitcoin Cash community, but not according to the 
Bitcoin community. (It should be obvious that which of them ends up 
with the “Bitcoin” name is a socially determined fact.) 
Blockchain forks are consensus failures. Each blockchain by itself 
achieves local consensus, but there is no global consensus. Blockchain 
forks also create explicit ambiguity. The choice of blockchain exposes 
ambiguity not present when looking at each blockchain by itself. These 
two facts are inextricably linked, because it is consensus that resolves 
ambiguity on a blockchain. 
Literally anything on a blockchain is subject to the latent ambiguity 
that the blockchain itself could be upgraded out from underneath it.49 
Whether this actually happens is inescapably political. When there is a 
disagreement within a blockchain community about a particular 
upgrade, one of three things could happen. If the pro-upgrade faction 
backs down, the status quo prevails. If the anti-upgrade faction backs 
down, the upgrade happens. If neither faction backs down, the 
blockchain forks. (It should be obvious that which faction, if either, 
backs down, is an empirical and socially determined fact.) 
D. The DAO 
The  DAO — the initialism is short for “distributed autonomous 
organization” — was a kind of democratic online venture-capital fund.50 
A group of investors planned to join together by using a smart contract 
on the Ethereum blockchain to manage their affairs, rather than by 
forming a traditional business organization under the laws of a state. 
One (imperfect) analogy would be to a venture capital fund operated as 
 
48 I say “roughly” because SegWit complicated the formula for computing block size. 
49 See Adam J. Kolber, Not-So-Smart Blockchain Contracts and Artificial Responsibility, 21 
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 198, 223 (2018) (“So if you agreed to follow the code in the broad sense, 
then you also agreed to the possibility of a hard fork.”). 
50 See generally Carla L. Reyes et al., Distributed Governance, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
ONLINE 1 (2017); Usha Rodrigues, Law and the Blockchain, 104 IOWA L. REV. 679 (2019). 
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a general partnership with all of the participants voting on each funding 
decision.51 
It flamed out spectacularly.52 A clever but still unidentified Ethereum 
user discovered a subtle bug in The DAO contract’s code and was able 
to transfer approximately $60 million worth of Ether to a contract that 
they alone controlled.53 
The transfers were quickly noticed, leading to a sharp debate among 
The DAO and Ethereum users over how to respond.54 In the end, a large 
majority of Ethereum users upgraded Ethereum to recognize as valid a 
new special block with a transaction that unwound The DAO and 
returned all the funds to the original investors. On this blockchain, 
which is still known as Ethereum, The DAO and The DAO hack 
effectively never happened. A minority of users refused to recognize the 
special block because they considered it contrary to the spirit of smart 
contracts, blockchains, and Ethereum.55 On this blockchain, which is 
known as Ethereum Classic, The DAO and The DAO hack did happen. 
The two blockchains have different semantics. Indeed, they are 
incompatible. Transactions now can be entered either on the Ethereum 
blockchain and conform to its views of which transactions have 
happened (including The DAO, the hack, and the rollback) or on the 
Ethereum Classic blockchain and conform to its views (including The 
DAO and the hack but not the rollback).56 
 
51 See Christoph Jentzsch, Decentralized Autonomous Organization to Automate 
Governance, 
https://archive.org/stream/DecentralizedAutonomousOrganizations/WhitePaper_djvu.txt 
(explaining the implementation of the DAO). 
52 Matt Levine, Blockchain Company’s Smart Contracts Were Dumb, BLOOMBERG.COM 
(Jun. 17, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2016-06-17/blockchain-company-
s-smart-contracts-were-dumb. 
53 Nathaniel Popper, A Hacking of More Than $50 Million Dashes Hopes in the World of 
Virtual Currency, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 17, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/18/business/dealbook/hacker-may-have-removed-more-
than-50-million-from-experimental-cybercurrency-project.html.. For technical details, see Phil 
Daian, Analysis of the DAO exploit, Hacking Distributed (Jun. 18, 2016), 
http://hackingdistributed.com/2016/06/18/analysis-of-the-dao-exploit/. 
54 Joon Ian Wong & Ian Kar, Everything you need to know about the Ethereum “hard fork,” 
QUARTZ (Jul. 18, 2016), https://qz.com/730004/everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-
ethereum-hard-fork/. 
55 The Ethereum Classic Declaration of Independence, ETHEREUM CLASSIC, 
https://ethereumclassic.github.io/assets/ETC_Declaration_of_Independence.pdf. 
56 Aaron van Wirdum, Ethereum Classic Community Navigates a Distinct Path to the 
Future, BITCOIN MAGAZINE (Aug. 19, 2016), https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/ethereum-
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The DAO was also (purportedly) governed by a legal contract, 
although its main job was to defer as much as possible to the smart 
contract. It stated: 
The terms of The DAO Creation are set forth in the smart contract code 
existing on the Ethereum blockchain at 
0xbb9bc244d798123fde783fcc1c72d3bb8c189413. Nothing in this 
explanation of terms or in any other document or communication may 
modify or add any additional obligations or guarantees beyond those set 
forth in The DAO’s code.57 
In hindsight, this passage is underspecified. The phrase “the 
Ethereum blockchain” does not uniquely refer. Does it mean Ethereum 
or Ethereum Classic?58 It uniquely referred when the contract was 
drafted, but no longer. It became underspecified — just like any 
reference to a blockchain could, at any time.59 
CONCLUSION 
We began with three motivations for smart contracts: ambiguity, 
corruption, and enforcement. It is obvious that protocol changes, forks, 
51% attacks, and other consensus breakdowns are a kind of corruption 
threat to smart contracts. They subject smart contracts to abrogation or 
alteration at the whims of other blockchain users.60 It is also obvious that 
the difficulty of getting people to use a blockchain at all is an enforcement 
threat. It doesn’t matter what a smart contract controlling asset-title tokens 
on a blockchain says if no one in the physical world pays any attention to 
the blockchain. 
We should also understand the problem of consensus as an ambiguity 
threat. Natural languages are embedded in communities of people who use 
and understand those languages. This introduces ambiguity and 
uncertainty, because people may use and understand the same words in 
 
57 The DAO - Explanation of Terms and Disclaimer, THE DAO COMMUNITY (Aug. 3, 2016), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20160803111447/https://daohub.org/explainer.html. 
58 It should be obvious that the social fact that one of the blockchains is commonly called 
“Ethereum” and the other is not is relevant but not conclusive in resolving this ambiguity. 
59 See Kolber, supra note 48, at 222 ("saying that the code is the contract is ambiguous as to 
precisely what is meant by the code. "). 
60 As I write this, Ethereum Classic was subjected to a $500,000 double-spending attack 
based on a well-executed deep fork by users who temporarily dominated its mining power. Dan 
Goodin, Almost $500,000 in Ethereum Classic coin stolen by forking its blockchain, ARS 
TECHNICA (Jan. 8, 2019), https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2019/01/almost-
500000-in-ethereum-coin-stolen-by-forking-its-blockchain/. 
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different ways. But it also provides a backstop on how badly natural-
language contracts can fail. In many cases, the meaning of a contract is 
clear to a large fraction of people in the relevant linguistic community. If 
a contract isn’t worth the paper it’s printed on, it is because of corruption 
or enforcement problems, not because of ambiguity. 
Programming languages appear to reduce linguistic ambiguity. In 
many cases, they do. Relative to a given implementation, a computer 
program’s meaning is far more definite than a typical natural-language 
term’s meaning. The very process of reducing a term to a formal-language 
expression requires a degree of precision from its drafters that can itself 
force them to understand and express their intentions more clearly. 
But because programming languages are formal, constructed systems, 
when the bottom drops out, it can really drop out. The relevant community 
can redefine the programming language in a way that radically alters the 
meaning of programs written in it. Smart contracts on a blockchain are 
particularly vulnerable to this. The same consensus mechanism that keeps 
them in a local equilibrium can lock them quickly into a new and very 
different equilibrium — indeed, there are often powerful incentives for 
users to push the blockchain into a different equilibrium. Blockchain-
based smart-contract programming languages don’t have continual 
linguistic drift; they have occasional earthquakes. 
In a legal system, the way to change the consequences of contracts is 
to change the law. The natural-language terms in legal contracts still mean 
what they used to, but their legal effects are different. But on a blockchain, 
the way to change the consequences of contracts is to change the 
semantics. The programming-language terms in smart contracts mean 
something different than they used to, and they have different technical 
effects, and these two differences are the same thing. Interpretation and 
construction collapse.61 
This is neither the first nor the last word on ambiguity in smart 
contracts. I have argued the narrow point that perfect unambiguity is 
impossible even in theory, because the technical layer ultimately rests on 
a social one.62 There is a complementary and broader critique of smart 
 
61  Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 
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social software. See James Grimmelmann, Anarchy, Status Updates, and Utopia, 35 PACE L. 
REV. 135 (2014). 
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contracts — spelled out best in papers by Karen Levy,63 Jeremy Sklaroff,64 
and Kevin Werbach and Nicholas Cornell65 —that even where they do 
provide unambiguous incorruptible automatic enforcement, this may not 
be what contracting parties want or need. Writing code is hard, and 
debugging it is even harder: one advantage of vague and ambiguous 
natural language is that it is cheaper and faster to negotiate and write down. 
And sometimes flexibility is good. As Levy explains of legal contracts, 
As such, it can be both operationally and socially beneficial to leave some 
terms underspecified; vagueness preserves operational flexibility for 
parties to deal with newly arising circumstances after an agreement is 
made, and sets the stage for social stability in an ongoing relationship.66 
And this is to say nothing of the use of smart contracts for socially 
harmful purposes,67 the environmental costs of blockchain mining, or the 
recent blockchain investment bubble.68 
However, all is not lost for the smart-contract project. Smart contracts 
cannot be perfectly unambiguous, but they do not need to be perfect to be 
useful. Socially determined facts are empirically contingent; they are 
always open to contestation and change. Legal contracts also depend on 
socially determined facts, and this has not stopped them from having an 
extremely successful multi-thousand-year run. Much of the time, legal 
contracts work adequately, despite the ambiguities of natural language. If 
smart contracts can perform as well or better in even a single domain, they 
will have a worthwhile role to play.  
For better and for worse, blockchains make consensus explicit. The 
mechanism that holds a blockchain together is the process for agreeing on 
the next block. Whatever that process yields — in all of its technical and 
social complexity — is the next block. Every smart contract is therefore 
only as resilient as its underlying blockchain. Contract law depends on 
social institutions, particularly those that establish and limit the 
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governments which enforce contracts. Smart contracts depend on social 
institutions too, particularly those that establish and limit blockchain 
communities. A blockchain whose governance fails will collapse, fork, or 
be vulnerable to hijacking. All of these threaten the smart contracts that 
run on it. There is no escape from politics, because blockchains are made 
out of people.69 
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